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SUMMARY
• Understanding how poverty is distributed between regions, cities and
neighbourhoods is important for public policy but until now it has been
difficult to map changing patterns of poverty because of changing
boundaries and changing indicators over time. The 2001 Census offers
a new opportunity.
• This paper has its origins in earlier work carried out at CASE by
Glennerster et al. (1999), which mapped neighbourhood poverty for 1991
using two indicators: a measure of ‘work-poverty’: the proportion of
people of working age not working, studying or training; and the Breadline
Britain relative poverty measure. This paper replicates the analysis of the
work-poverty data for 2001, comparing it with 1991.
• Nationally, the rate of work-poverty in England dropped in the 1990s from
24.4% in 1991 to 22.0% in 2001, mainly because of increases in
employment and higher education among women.This resulted in a 44%
drop in the number of high work-poverty neighbourhoods (defined as
those with 40% or more of their working age population not working or
studying).There was a similar drop in the number of people living in such
neighbourhoods and in the number of work-poor individuals living in such
neighbourhoods.
• Some large clusters of poverty were broken up. In 1991 there were 22
clusters of contiguous high work-poverty wards with populations of
20,000 people or more. 17 remained in 2001. The largest cluster in
1991, Liverpool, with 25 wards and a population of 265,000, had
reduced by 2001 to three smaller clusters with a combined population
of 112,000, because of reductions in work-poverty in the remainder of
its component wards.
•These changes were achieved because most neighbourhoods, especially
the poorest, saw reductions in work-poverty. For most, these were not
dramatic changes. However some poor neighbourhoods, mainly those in
central city locations or close to universities, saw significant
transformation, with reductions in work-poverty of over 20 percentage
points.
• Other poor neighbourhoods did not benefit, and experienced static or
rising levels of work-poverty. These were mainly inner-ring urban
neighbourhoods, and especially those with high proportions of Pakistani
and Bangladeshi residents. The distribution of high work-poverty
neighbourhoods across regions also changed, with a reduction in
London’s share and an increasing share for the East and West Midlands.
• The findings point to the need to focus on the economic regeneration of
the inner urban areas of large industrial cities of the North and Midlands,
and to ensure that minority ethnic neighbourhoods do not continue to
miss out on the benefits of economic growth.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is the third in a series of Census Briefs
produced by CASE and inspired by the work of the
Brookings Institution in the United States whose Center
on Urban and Metropolitan Policy has played a creative
role in informing and in part helping shape the recovery
of US cities. The series aims to help advance the debate
on the future of cities and towns in Britain by presenting
evidence of key urban and neighbourhood trends during
the 1990s, using evidence from the 1991 and 2001
Censuses.The first paper in the series covered population
growth and decline in Britain’s cities and regions. The
second looked more closely at changes in the size and
distribution of minority ethnic groups, nationally and
within the major conurbations where they are
concentrated. This paper uses Census data to examine
changes in the geography of poverty, with a particular
focus on the largest clusters of concentrated poverty and
what happened to them during the 1990s.
Understanding how poverty is spatially distributed across
regions, cities and neighbourhoods is of critical
importance for public policy.The spatial concentration of
poverty matters partly for pragmatic reasons. Public
services usually have local delivery points.Youth workers,
housing officers, community workers and police officers
have to be deployed somewhere, and more will be needed
in areas of concentrated poverty than others. But
neighbourhood-based policy is also based on an
assumption that concentrations of poverty matter because
the clustering of the poor in the same areas creates
additional problems that would not be faced if they were
scattered: in other words that there are neighbourhood
poverty effects on individuals. Discussions of such effects
are often framed in terms of negative effects arising from
the social interactions of the poor: low aspirations, norms
of delinquent behaviour, a culture of welfare dependency
and so on. However, detrimental effects could also arise
in poor neighbourhoods independent of the cultures and
attitudes of their residents: for example because of limited
opportunities to network with influential contacts; lack of
power and influencing skills to lobby for better services;
discriminatory behaviour by employers; or only being able
to access public services that are under pressure and over
stretched (see Buck 2001 for a useful summary of the
theoretical propositions of the neighbourhood effects
literature). Moreover, high concentrations of poverty may
not be good for cities, generating little local taxation
income with which to support city services, deterring
business investment, and exacerbating the flight of high
income residents to the suburbs and countryside (DETR
2000, Rogers and Power 2000, Jargowsky 2003). We
cannot afford not to know where, and to what extent,
poverty is concentrated and how this changes over time in
response to policy interventions or to wider changes in
the economy and society.
The analysis of concentrated poverty that we present here
is based on research previously carried out at CASE in the
late 1990s by Philip Noden and colleagues (Glennerster
et al. 1999), who used two Census-based indicators to
measure poverty at the electoral ward level - the nearest
Census proxy for neighbourhood. One was a measure of
‘work-poverty’: the proportion of individuals of working
age within a ward who were not working, studying or
training.This took a deliberately broader and longer view
of labour market participation than the more typically-
used indicators of unemployment and economic
inactivity, and to some extent tried to address future
poverty and social exclusion as well as current status.
While students might be economically inactive and
sometimes poor, they were also engaged in training for
work that would probably lift them out of poverty in the
future. In using this definition, Glennerster et al. argued
that neighbourhoods with a high proportion of residents
involved in higher education could not justifiably be
regarded as having low and problematic labour market
capacity, even though their current economic activity
rates might be low.The second indicator was a score on a
ward-level index of poverty known as the Breadline
Britain Index (BBI). BBI was developed from a national
survey carried out in 1990 (Gordon and Pantazis 1997)
that first identified items that were regarded as necessities
by the majority of people in Britain, then established how
many, and what type of households were poor in the sense
of lacking three or more of these items. By matching
survey data to Census data on the type of households
within each ward, an estimation of the number of poor
households in a ward could be derived. The advantage of
this measure was that it defined poverty not just in labour
market terms but in terms of the ability to consume
essential goods and participate in essential social
activities. The two measures in combination gave a
rounded view of poverty.
The picture they painted was one a heavy skew of
concentrated poverty towards London and the industrial
regions of the North. One third of the poorest wards
(those which ranked in the top 5% on both indicators)
were in just nine local authorities: Sunderland,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Middlesbrough in the North
East; Liverpool and Knowsley on Merseyside;
Manchester in the North West; Birmingham in the West
Midlands; and Tower Hamlets and Hackney in London.
The vast majority were in areas classified by the ONS as
either Inner London or other areas with inner city
characteristics, coalfields, manufacturing or coastal
industry. It was a marked geography of poverty.
In this paper, we begin to look at how that picture
changed in the 1990s, with an analysis of Glennerster et
al’s first indicator - ‘work-poverty’.The second indicator,
Breadline Britain, was replicated in 1999 through a new
survey of poverty and social exclusion, based on the same
methodology (Gordon et al. 2000).The indicator has not
yet been modelled to ward level on a household basis.
Our analysis of the work-poverty indicator shows that
work-poverty has declined, and the largest falls have been
in the areas of highest work-poverty in 1991, resulting in
a slight convergence between poor areas and others,
although there is no evidence of a shaking-up of the
hierarchy of areas through the transformation of formerly
poor areas into relatively rich ones. The changes in work
poverty have impacted differently in different cities,
demonstrating the need for a better understanding of the
way that changes in the drivers of poverty and social
exclusion are impacting in different places, and the 
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need for urban policies that reflect these diverging
neighbourhood trajectories.
In producing this series, we owe a debt of thanks to
Bruce Katz and other colleagues in Brookings for
inspiring us to undertake the work jointly with them; to
Professor William Julius Wilson of Harvard for his
constant interest in our work on poor neighbourhoods
and his willingness to join the wider urban debate in this
country as well as in the US; to Professors Tony
Champion, Duncan McLennan and Ivan Turok for their
challenging advice and willingness to share expertise; to
David Lunts, head of the Urban Unit at ODPM and the
many other colleagues in government who have
encouraged us to do this work; also to Richard Best at
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation for supporting our
original work on the slow death of great cities and to
Richard Rogers for lending his expertise and experience
to our follow up to the Urban Task Force, Cities for a
Small Country (Rogers and Power 2000). Throughout,
we draw on our work in CASE for the area study funded
by the ESRC where we track 12 of the poorest urban
areas in the country over 7 years, written up by Ruth
Lupton (2003) and Katharine Mumford and Anne
Power (2003), and on the work of our colleagues at the
Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy at Brookings,
whose work on the US Census can be found at
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/issues/demographics/
demographics.htm.
In producing this third brief, we are particularly grateful
to Becky Tunstall, Alan Berube, Bruce Katz and
colleagues at Brookings, to Robert Sampson and
colleagues at Harvard University for their comments on
an earlier version of the paper, and to Danny Dorling of
the University of Sheffield and David Gordon of Bristol
University for their helpful advice and encouragement.
Census data has been made available by the Office for
National Statistics under Crown Copyright and is
reproduced here with the permission of the Controller of
HMSO and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland.
USING THE CENSUS TO ANALYSE CHANGES IN
THE GEOGRAPHY OF POVERTY
Mapping the changing geography of poverty in Britain is
problematic, mainly because of the lack of a single
poverty indicator held constant over time. In contrast to
its opposite number in the US, the UK Census does not
include a question on income, and the country’s large-
scale panel surveys do not have sufficient sample sizes to
enable neighbourhood-level analysis. A variety of area
deprivation measures and indices has been developed
during the 1990s and used to inform funding and policy
decisions, but each has been compiled using different
indicators and methods (Tunstall and Lupton 2003).
Thus we have simply not been in a position to answer
simple questions like “how many poor neighbourhoods
are there?”; “is their number growing or diminishing over
time?” “what proportion of the population and what
proportion of the poor live in poor neighbourhoods and
is this changing” or “is the geographic pattern of poor
neighbourhoods changing and why?” Dorling (personal
communication) notes that his preliminary work
mapping Breadline Britain data for macro-
neighbourhoods level (about 40,000 people or more)
represent the first maps of change in poverty rate ever to
be drawn below the local authority level - an astonishing
situation, and one that contrasts sharply with that in the
US, where Paul Jargowsky’s detailed Census tract
analysis (Jargowsky 1997 and 2003) has provided an
invaluable portrait of the changing make-up of urban
areas over three decades. Jargowsky’s findings revealed
rising poverty concentrations and central city decline
between 1970 and 1990; shrinking poverty clusters in the
1990s arising from economic recovery and affecting all
ethnic groups, but with rising neighbourhood poverty in
some inner-ring suburbs, possibly as a direct result of
peripheral urban development.
The 2001 Census in Britain offers a new opportunity to
fill this knowledge gap. Although there is still no income
question, there is at least the opportunity to compare
measures that have been held constant from 1991. In
this analysis, we use SAS Table 8 from the 1991 Census
and Standard Table 28 from the 2001 Census which
enable a direct comparison of the numbers and
proportion of people of working age (16-59 for women
and 16-64 for men) not working or studying in each
year. People who are not working or studying may be
those who are unemployed, permanently sick or
disabled, those who have taken early retirement or are
looking after home or family, or those who are
economically inactive for other reasons, perhaps because
they have another source of income. It is important to
emphasise that this is a labour market measure, not a
direct measure of income poverty or deprivation nor a
measure that will reflect poverty that is not work-related
(for example pensioner poverty).1 To reflect this, we tend
to refer to ‘work-poverty’ and ‘high work-poverty
neighbourhoods’, rather than ‘high poverty’, although
this term is sometimes used for brevity.
‘Neighbourhood’ here is defined by electoral wards,2 and
a high work-poverty neighbourhood is defined here as
one where 40% or more of the working age population is
not working, studying or training. Like any threshold, this
one is somewhat arbitrary. It needed to be high enough
to include only a minority of wards that would clearly be
identified by experienced observers as being unusually
poor. In the US data, Jargowsky’s 40% poverty threshold
included 5.7% of all Census tracts in 1991. Given that
UK wards are larger than US Census tracts, a smaller
percentage should probably be included in any British
analysis. Glennerster et al., using their combination of
measures, identified 3% of neighbourhoods (284) that
were in the top 5% on both indices. Another way to
determine the appropriate threshold is in relation to the
national level of poverty. In 1991, overall, 24% of the
population were work-poor. A 30% neighbourhood cut-
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1 Although the work-poverty measure is not a direct measure of poverty or deprivation,
the distribution of poverty wards that it produces corresponds well with that
produced by average ward income estimates modeled by ONS for 1998. It also
corresponds well with the 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation, although relative to
this, it tends to overstate poverty in the North East and understate it in London.
2 The average electoral ward has about 5000 people, although they tend to be smaller
in rural areas and much larger in large cities (up to about 30,000). The number of
wards, and their boundaries, changed in many areas during the 1990s. We use 1991
boundaries for 1991 wards and 2001 boundaries for 2001 wards, which makes
comparison of individual wards impossible except where boundaries were unchanged,
but provides a comparable picture overall between the two years.
off is low relative to this figure and captures too many
wards (14%). A 40% cut-off captures 3% - a small
number of wards (only 250 in 1991) - and may be
criticised for being too high. However, it certainly
includes wards that could be agreed to be seriously and
distinctively poor, and is consistent with both
Glennerster et al’s UK analysis of the number of poor
wards, and with Jargowsky’s US poverty threshold. For
these reasons, we have used it in this analysis. We also
describe changes based on the 30% threshold, for
comparison purposes.
It is important to note some key differences between the
1991 and 2001 Censuses, that make comparison
problematic.We have described these in detail in the first
paper in this series (Lupton and Power 2004a) and more
information can also be found on the National Statistics
website (www.statistics.gov.uk). We note them briefly
here. One is that the 1991 Census suffered from more
serious under-enumeration problems than the 2001
Census, and these were not corrected prior to the release
of the Census data, in contrast to 2001 when figures were
adjusted pre-release. Thus figures for change 1991-2001
can appear greater than they actually were.The second is
the treatment of students. In 1991, students were
counted at their vacation address and in 2001 at their
term address; a decision which clearly has major
implications for comparison across Censuses, especially
when the proportion of people studying is used as a key
indicator. Inner neighbourhoods in university cities
appear to have large increases in their populations and
reductions in their work-poverty rates, caused only by the
different counting method. Fortunately, ward-level
population estimates for 1991 with students transferred
to their term address were produced during the 1990s
and these estimates have been used here.3 However, they
are not available for Britain as a whole.The analysis here,
therefore, is confined to England.
Using this data, we look first at the distribution of high
work-poverty neighbourhoods in 1991, then in 2001,
looking both at absolute changes in work-poverty and at
the relative situation. We focus particularly on analysing
change in those areas which had large clusters of poverty,
incorporating large numbers of contiguous high work-
poverty wards.We then draw on wider evidence of trends
during the 1990s to explain the changes observed, before
drawing conclusions about the meaning of the changes
both for our understanding of the geography of poverty
and for public policy.
HIGH WORK-POVERTY 
NEIGHBOURHOODS IN 1991
In 1991, just under 3% (250) of England’s 8519 wards
were ‘high work-poverty neighbourhoods’, using the
threshold of 40% or more of working age population in
work- poverty, with just over 14% (1205) being poor
using the 30% threshold.
High work-poverty wards were predominantly in urban
areas. Because such areas have larger electoral wards than
rural areas, the proportion of England’s population living
in high-poverty wards was higher than the proportion of
wards. A little over 2 million people lived in the 40%
work-poor wards, 4.5% of the total population. The 30%
work-poor wards had a total population of nearly 10
million people (20.3% of the total population).
Work-poor individuals were more clustered in work-poor
wards than the population as a whole. The 40% work-
poor wards had half a million work-poor residents, 7.7%
of England’s work-poor population. The 30% work-poor
wards had 2 million work-poor residents, 29% of the
work-poor population.
The distribution of the high work-poverty wards, and of
their populations, was heavily skewed towards the
industrial regions of the North. Nearly three-quarters of
the 40% work-poor wards, and their populations, were in
the North East, North West, or Yorkshire and
Humberside, even though these regions only had a
quarter of the wards overall and a third of the population
(Table 2). The most disproportionate share of the 40%
work-poor wards was in the North East (30.0% of the
work-poor wards compared with 5.7% of the wards
overall, and in the North West (34.0% compared with
11.8% of the wards). Apart from these two regions and
Yorkshire and Humberside, all the other regions had
lower numbers of high work-poverty wards than would be
expected given their overall number of wards. London
was an interesting case, with a relatively low proportion of
very high work-poverty wards (40%+ work-poor), but a
disproportionately high proportion of wards with 30% or
more work-poverty, reflecting the nature of the city with
its adjacent pockets of poverty and wealth, in contrast to
the more uniform poverty of neighbourhoods in industrial
areas outside the capital.
The disproportionate presence of high work-poverty
wards among the wards in the North East and North West
meant that considerable proportions of the populations of
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TABLE 1: Numbers of Wards with Different Levels 
of Work-Poverty 1991
50% or more 34 0.4 301 0.6 87 1.2
40% or more 250 2.9 2,187 4.5 544 7.7
30% or more 1205 14.1 9,798 20.3 2,044 29.0
20% or more 5596 65.7 33,769 70.0 5,462 77.6
Total 8519
Number 
of wards
% of Working Age
Population in 
Work-poverty
% of
wards
Population
(000s)
% of 
Pop.
Work-poor
Population
(000s)
% of
work-poor
Population
TABLE 2: Regional Shares of Work-Poor Wards 
and Their Populations
North East 30.0 18.7 5.7 20.4 13.3 5.4
North West 34.0 19.8 11.8 36.8 22.4 14.3
Yorks & Humbs 10.4 11.5 7.3 14.3 15.9 10.3
East Mids 8.4 10.4 10.8 5.4 7.5 8.4
West Mids 5.2 7.2 9.4 12.9 11.6 10.9
Eastern 1.6 5.1 13.9 1.0 3.8 10.7
London 7.6 15.9 8.9 7.1 17.2 14.3
South East 1.6 4.6 18.4 0.9 3.5 15.9
South West 1.2 6.9 13.7 1.2 4.7 9.8
40% 
work-poor
Wards
Percentage of Wards
in each Region
30% 
work-poor
Wards All Wards
40% 
work-poor
Wards
Percentage of Population
in each Region
30% 
work-poor
Wards All Wards
these regions, and the work-poor populations, lived in
high work-poverty wards. Thus, an individual who was
not working or studying in the North East or North West
was much more likely to be living in a ward with high
proportions of others in similar circumstances than a
similar individual in other regions (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1: Percentage of the Work-Poor Population living 
in Wards with Different Concentrations of Work-Poverty,
by Region
The ethnic composition of the work-poor wards was
also different from region to region. In the North East,
nearly all of the work-poor wards were predominantly
white, with 5% or fewer of the population from ethnic
minorities. In the North West, Yorkshire/Humber and
the East Midlands, most poor wards had minority
populations below the national average of about 5%.
However, in London, none of the poor wards were
predominantly white using this definition. Most of
them had significant proportions (25%+) of their
populations from ethnic minorities (Figure 2). Poor
wards in London were mainly neighbourhoods with
high ethnic minority populations living in public
housing. Poor neighbourhoods in the West Midlands
were also typically areas with high concentrations of
ethnic minorities, in this case usually Pakistani and
Bangladeshi communities, and usually in privately
owned or rented accommodation. Such communities
were also found among the poor wards of the North
West and Yorks/Humber, although these regions also
had a large number of predominantly white high work-
poverty wards. These differences are likely to be
important if we are to formulate effective policy
towards poor neighbourhoods, given not only the
different cultural needs of the different ethnic
communities and their varying success in the labour
market, but also their different demographics.
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in England
are relatively recently arrived, within the last two to
three decades, and have continuing immigration.Their
populations are younger and have higher growth rates
than the majority white community or the longer -
established black Caribbean community. High work-
poverty areas with populations of this nature are likely
to experience population growth, particularly in the
age cohorts entering the labour market: growth which
is not necessarily in line with trends in labour supply
in those areas.
FIGURE 2: Proportions of Ethnic Minorities 
in 40% Work-Poor Wards, by Region
CLUSTERS OF HIGH WORK-POVERTY
NEIGHBOURHOODS
Although we have described high work-poverty wards
and their characteristics as individual units, it was a
salient factor of the distribution of poor wards in 1991
that many of them did not stand alone as isolated pockets
of poverty, demarcated by their ward boundary. 46%
(116) were located adjacent to at least one other such
ward, forming a cluster that was at least 20,000 people in
size, at least the size of a large inner urban ward.4 These
wards formed 22 significant clusters in all, listed in Table
3. Most were not large, containing just a handful of wards
and fewer than 50,000 people, and in fact, in many areas
of the country, there were none or few large areas of
consistently high work-poverty. The Eastern region,
South East and South West had no 40% work-poor wards
in clusters of 20,000 population or more. Even in the
North East, with its high proportion of high work-poverty
wards, most were isolated or in small clusters, reflecting
the industrial make-up of this region, with small ex-
mining villages as well as major coastal towns and cities
like Newcastle and Middlesbrough.
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3 These are known as the EWCpop estimates and were produced by the ESRC
Estimating with Confidence project in the late 1990s.
4 Other high work-poverty wards were located next to one another, but formed clusters
of fewer than 20,000 population that were themselves smaller than many wards.
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However, some parts of the country were characterised by
large concentrations of work-poverty. In the North West,
67% of the high work-poverty wards (and 5.5% of all
wards) were in one of the large clusters, indicating a much
more extensive concentration of poverty in large bands of
contiguous wards, rather than in smaller, distinct
groupings. Over half of these clustered wards were in one
of two large clusters. One was in Liverpool, covering not
just the inner area of Liverpool city, but wards in Sefton
and Knowsley, beyond the city boundary, made up mainly
of large social housing estates. This cluster contained
about 265,000 people, and 73,000 in work-poverty
(Table 3). The other large North West cluster was in
Manchester, incorporating the city centre and inner ring
wards in Manchester and the district of Salford. The
region also had a number of smaller clusters, in the
Lancashire textile towns such as Oldham and Rochdale
and in outer areas of the Liverpool conurbation, such as
Speke, Netherton and Valley.
Four-fifths (77%) of the poorest wards in the West
Midlands were also clustered, most of them in one large
cluster in inner Birmingham, extending into the
neighbouring district of Sandwell. In this region, however,
the clustered wards made up only 1.0% of all the wards in
the region, indicating a pronounced concentration of the
poorest wards amongst generally low levels of poverty
concentration.
Ethnic composition data for the clusters appear in Table 7
where we return to them later in the paper. In common
with the pattern for high work-poverty wards as a whole,
clusters in the North East had predominantly white
populations, while the Birmingham cluster had a very
high South Asian population, principally Pakistani, and
the clusters in the North West were either predominantly
white (such as Liverpool) or had high South Asian
populations, such as Oldham.
HIGH WORK-POVERTY 
NEIGHBOURHOODS 2001
Census data for 2001 shows a dramatic fall in the number
of high-poverty neighbourhoods (Table 4). The number
of wards at or exceeding the 40% work-poor threshold fell
from 250 to 140 (a reduction of 44%) and the number of
wards at or exceeding the 30% threshold from 1205 to
772 (a reduction of 36%).5
In 2001, 1.2 million people lived in the 40% work-poor
wards, about 60% of the total in 1991, and they
accounted for just 2.5% of the overall population,
compared with 4.5% in 1991. 6.5 million people lived in
the 30% work-poor wards, 66% of the total in 1991, and
they accounted for 13% of the population, compared with
20% in 1991.
As in 1991, the work-poor were more clustered in the
poor wards than the population as a whole. In fact there
was a very slight increase over the decade in the difference
between the proportion of the work-poor population
living in the high work-poverty wards and the proportion
of the overall population. Nevertheless the 40% work-
poor wards only contained 4.8% of the work-poor
population in 2001, compared with 7.7% in 1991.
Not all regions lost high-poverty neighbourhoods at the
same rate. Of the regions with significant numbers of
high-poverty (40%) wards in 1991, the North East, North
West, and Yorkshire and Humberside all lost high-poverty
wards at about the national rate, about two-fifths of the
1991 number. The West and East Midlands, however,
retained more of their poverty wards, while in London
there was a dramatic reduction from 19 high-poverty
wards in 1991 to just 2 in 2001 (Figure 3).
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TABLE 3: Poverty Clusters of 20,000 Population 
or More, 1991
Liverpool North West 25 264808 72714 148012 49.1
Birmingham West Midlands 8 213416 51056 113529 45.0
Manchester North West 10 113221 28381 62458 45.4
Middlesbrough North East 14 79104 21531 43758 49.2
Sunderland North East 7 74153 19572 42893 45.6
Sheffield Yorks/Humber 4 62091 14076 33380 42.2
Manningham Yorks/Humber 3 59234 13215 31965 41.3
Wirral North West 4 57116 14831 31644 46.9
Tower Hamlets London 5 42799 9726 23170 42.0
Blackburn North West 6 38501 9436 20579 45.9
Stockton North East 6 36150 8986 20309 44.2
Wolverhampton West Midlands 2 25770 6231 14851 42.0
Speke North West 2 25729 6438 13856 46.5
Bolton North West 2 25156 6071 13418 45.2
Hartlepool North East 4 25145 6609 14363 46.0
Rochdale North West 2 24745 5528 13387 41.3
Oldham North West 2 23785 5185 12261 42.3
Barnsley Yorks/Humber 2 23509 6125 13567 45.1
Leicester East Midlands 2 23361 6206 13538 45.8
Netherton North West 2 21013 4844 11948 40.5
Derby East Midlands 2 20737 4638 11210 41.4
Valley North West 2 20408 5236 11813 44.3
TOTAL 116 1299950 326635 715907
RegionCluster Name
No. of 
Wards Population
Working
age pop
adjusted
for
students
new
Work-Poor
Population
% of
Cluster
wkg age
Population
in Work-
Poverty
TABLE 4: Numbers of Wards with Different 
Levels of Work-Poverty 2001
50% or more 13 0.2 106 0.2 32 0.4
40% or more 140 1.8 1240 2.5 320 4.8
30% or more 772 9.7 6510 13.2 1389 20.9
20% or more 3671 46.3 25926 52.7 4242 63.8
TOTAL 7932
Number of 
wards
Percentage of Working
Age Population in 
Work-poverty
% of
wards
Population
(000s)
% of
Population
Work-poor
Population
(000s)
% of
work-poor
Population
5 Due to local government reorganisation, the number of wards overall also reduced in
the 1990s, from 8519 to 7969. Some of these were so small that economic status data
for 2001 was not made publicly available. The remaining total of 7932 wards is 93%
of the number of wards in 1991. This reduction is not sufficient to account for the
reduction in the number of high work-poverty wards.
FIGURE 3: Changes in the Numbers of High Work-Poverty
Wards 1991-2001, by Region
As a result, while the skew in the distribution of high
work-poverty wards towards the industrial regions of the
North remained in 2001, the Midlands regions increased
their share of high work-poverty wards, and London
reduced its share. Among the 30% work-poverty wards,
most of the high work-poverty regions increased their
share of the total, as wards with poverty rates in the 40-
50% band fell into the 30-40% band, and London
reduced its share (Table 5).
The result of these reductions was that most regions had
a lower proportion of their overall population, and their
work-poor population, living in high work-poverty
neighbourhoods in 2001 than in 1991. In the West
Midlands, where the majority of the work-poor
population lived in neighbourhoods with highly
concentrated Asian populations, there was only a very
small decrease in the proportion of the overall population
living in the work-poor neighbourhoods, and an increase
in the proportion of the work-poor population living in
such neighbourhoods (Table 6).
CHANGES TO HIGH WORK-POVERTY CLUSTERS
Reductions in work-poverty even in high work-poverty
wards meant that large poverty clusters broke up. Overall,
fewer work-poor wards were clustered in 2001 (41%
compared with 46% in 1991). In 1991, there were 22
clusters of poor wards with populations of at least 20,000.
We list these again in Table 7, showing what had
happened to them by 2001.
10 of the clusters had shrunk below 20,000 population.
These were mainly the smaller clusters, with the Sheffield
and Sunderland clusters being notable exceptions. In
some cases, the wards in these clusters were losing
population, but principally the change came about
because one or more of them reduced its work-poverty
rate below 40%.
Of the remaining 12 clusters:
• 10 remained above 20,000 but saw reductions in their
populations and work-poor populations. These are
marked in italics in Table 7. This was usually not just
because the wards lost population, but because the
number of wards in the cluster reduced, because some
wards dropped below the 40% work-poverty threshold.
The Liverpool and Manchester clusters saw very
dramatic reductions in the numbers of contiguous
poverty wards, from 25 to 5 in Liverpool’s case and from
10 to 2 in Manchester’s. The Liverpool cluster
effectively split into 3 smaller clusters interspersed with
less poor wards. However, across this group of clusters,
work-poverty rates in 2001 were either higher in the new
smaller clusters than they had been in the larger clusters
of 1991, or only slightly lower. In other words, there
were stubborn pockets of poverty that remained while
others improved.
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TABLE 5: Regional Shares of Work-Poor Wards 
1991 and 2001
North East 30.0 30.0 18.7 21.9
North West 34.0 35.7 19.8 25.5
Yorks & Humbs 10.4 10.7 11.5 10.6
East Mids 8.4 11.4 10.4 10.9
West Mids 5.2 7.9 7.2 9.2
Eastern 1.6 1.4 5.1 3.6
London 7.6 1.4 15.9 10.1
South East 1.6 0.7 4.6 4.4
South West 1.2 0.7 6.9 3.8
North
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TABLE 6: : Percentage of Population Living in High Work-Poverty Wards 1991 and 2001, by Region
Regional share (%) of 40% 
work-poor wards 
1991 2001 1991 2001
Regional share (%) of 30% 
work-poor wards 
North East
North West
Yorks & Humbs
East Mids
West Mids
Eastern
London
South East
South West
17.1
11.7
6.3
2.9
5.4
0.4
2.3
0.2
0.6
10.0
6.5
3.7
1.6
5.0
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.0
24.2
18.5
9.8
5.0
8.6
0.7
3.4
0.5
1.0
15.0
11.3
6.4
3.0
9.2
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.1
50.2
31.8
31.3
18.3
21.5
7.2
24.5
4.5
9.8
38.6
23.9
21.4
12.2
17.8
2.9
12.5
2.4
3.7
60.9
43.7
42.0
26.0
29.8
10.1
32.1
6.7
13.9
48.6
34.9
31.1
19.0
27.0
4.9
17.6
4.2
6.1
% of work-poor population living 
in 30% work-poor neighbourhoods
1991 2001
% of total population living in 30% 
work-poor neighbourhoods
1991 2001
% of work-poor population living 
in 40% work-poor neighbourhoods
1991 2001
% of total population living in 40% 
work-poor neighbourhoods
1991 2001
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• 2 (Birmingham and Oldham) retained the same
number of wards and either gained in population or
held their population at about the 1991 level. These
clusters are marked with an asterix in Table 7. These
were clusters with high proportions of ethnic
minority residents in 1991, predominantly Pakistani
or Bangladeshi in origin. They had similar work-
poverty rates in 2001 as in 1991, as well as increased
proportions of ethnic minorities.6 There were other
clusters with high proportions of ethnic minorities in
1991 that did not follow this pattern. Leicester’s
minority population is primarily Indian rather than
Pakistani, and in the case of the Tower Hamlets and
Blackburn clusters, cluster sizes reduced because
surrounding wards which had lower minority ethnic
populations reduced their work-poverty rates, not
because the high minority wards reduced theirs. In
both cases, the smaller clusters remaining in 2001
had similar work-poverty rates to the larger clusters
of 1991 and high proportions of minorities. Again,
this was a pattern of stubborn residual pockets of
poverty that did not see the reductions in
worklessness witnessed elsewhere.
In addition there were three new, small, poverty clusters
in Hull and Newcastle, making 17 clusters in all in 2001.
Maps 1-6 demonstrate what happened to the largest
work poverty clusters: Liverpool, Birmingham and
Manchester.
TABLE 7: Work-Poverty Clusters in 1991 and 2001
25
8
10
14
7
4
3
4
5
6
6
2
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
116
1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991
Number of WardsCluster Name 
1991
What happened to Cluster 
1991-2001
Cluster Name
2001
Population (000s) Work-poverty Rate % Black or Asian
2001
Liverpool
Pirrie
Huyton
Birmingham
Manchester
M’brough
Manningham
Wirral
Tower Hamlets
Blackburn
Speke
Bolton
Rochdale 
Oldham
Hull North
Hull South
Newcastle East
Liverpool
*Birmingham
Manchester
Middlesbrough 
Sunderland
Sheffield
Manningham
Wirral
Tower Hamlets
Blackburn
Stockton
Wolverhampton
Speke
Bolton
Hartlepool N
Rochdale 
*Oldham
Barnsley
Leicester
Netherton
Derby 
Valley
TOTAL
Smaller
Larger
Smaller
Smaller
Reduced below 20,000 
Reduced below 20,000
Smaller
Smaller
Smaller
Smaller
Reduced below 20,000
Reduced below 20,000
Smaller
Smaller
Reduced below 20,000
Smaller
Same
Reduced below 20,000
Reduced below 20,000
Reduced below 20,000
Reduced below 20,000
Reduced below 20,000
5
2
4
9
2
10
2
3
2
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
58
265
213
113
79
74
62
59
57
43
39
36
26
26
25
25
25
24
23
23
21
21
20
56
26
30
234
22
59
35
35
23
30
22
24
23
24
21
21
24
49.1
45.0
45.4
49.2
45.6
42.2
41.3
46.9
42.0
45.9
44.2
42.0
46.5
45.2
46.0
41.3
42.3
45.1
45.8
40.5
41.4
44.3
47.6
45.9
48.8
44.8
46.2
45.1
43.0
46.9
42.6
45.6
44.0
42.4
42.5
44.1
41.8
44.2
45.3
1
49
7
2
0
7
47
0
31
35
0
20
1
37
0
32
35
0
55
0
18
1
4
1
2
71
32
4
62
2
54
62
3
49
45
58
4
1
3
6 These comparisons of ethnic minority population between the 1991 and 2001
Censuses are problematic. They are based on raw Census counts and therefore do not
take account of underenumeration in the 1991 Census, which was thought to be
higher among minority groups, nor of the change from counting students at their
vacation to their term addresses. However, other work using more complex methods
of estimation to take account of these problems (Lupton and Power 2004b) indicates
that the changes were of a similar magnitude.
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MAP 1
1991
MAP 2
2001
Ward Work-Poverty Rate.
less than 20%
20-29%
30-39%
40% or more
Liverpool, Sefton and Knowsley 1991-2001
Work Poverty Rates of 
Clustered Wards 1991 and 2001
1. Princess (63.2, 57.6)
2. Everton (60.7, 36.6)
3. Longview (60.0, 54.8)
4. Vauxhall (58.3, 54.9)
5. Northwood (57.5, 49.1)
6. Granby (56.4, 50.3)
7. Cantril Farm (55.0, 52.5)
8. Kirkby Central (53.8, 44.9)
9. Linacre (52.0, 47.2)
10. Cherryfield (51.4, 46.0)
11. Breckfield (50.0, 51.1)
12. Dovecot (50.1, 41.1)
13. Clubmoor (49.3, 45.8)
14. Tower Hill (49.2, 38.7)
15. Pirrie (48.8, 46.0)
16. Smithdown (47.0, 38.7)
17. St Gabriels (45.1, 39.3)
18. Melrose (45.7, 46.0)
19. St Michaels (45.1, 39.0)
20. Gillmoss (44.5, 31.1)
21. Page Moss (42.3, 37.8)
22. Kensington (41.7, 43.4)
23. County (40.1, 39.4)
24. Knowsley Park (43.7, 37.1)
25. Whitefield (41.9, 34.1)
Speke Cluster
Liverpool Cluster
Valley Cluster
Netherton Cluster
Speke Cluster
Huyton Cluster
Pirrie Cluster
Liverpool Cluster
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Wards in Manchester Cluster
Work Poverty Percentages 
1991 and 2001
1. Central (54.5, 27.3)
2. Cheetham (51.4, 47.0)
3. Harpurhey (47.5, 44.9)
4. Beswick (46.2, 45.7)
5. Blackfriars (42.6, 30.5)
6. Bradford (44.2, 43.0)
7. Ardwick (44.6, 36.3)
8. Ordsall (41.3, 32.1)
9. Broughton (40.0, 39.9)
10. Newton Heath (40.4, 39.9)
Ward Work-Poverty Rate.
less than 20%
20-29%
30-39%
40% or more
Manchester, Salford and Trafford 1991 and 2001
MAP 3
1991
MAP 4
2001
Manchester Cluster
Manchester Cluster
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Wards in Birmingham Cluster
% Work-Poor 1991 and 2001
1. Sparkbrook (51.5, 51.4)
2. Aston (49.4, 47.9)
3. Soho and Victoria (44.8, 43.1)
4. Soho (42.2, 42.6)
5. Handsworth (42.0, 43.4)
6. Nechells (44.1, 40.2)
7. Small Heath (45.4, 46.4)
8. Washwood Heath (40.9, 44.7)
Ward Work-Poverty Rate.
less than 20%
20-29%
30-39%
40% or more
Birmingham and Sandwell 1991 and 2001
MAP 5
1991
MAP 6
2001
Birmingham Cluster
Birmingham Cluster
The Liverpool cluster in 1991 contained 25 contiguous
poverty wards stretching from Liverpool city centre,
alongside the River Mersey, through the inner ring of the
city and joining up with poor wards in the towns of
Kirkby and Huyton in the adjacent Borough of Knowsley.
There were significant reductions in work-poverty across
the cluster during the 1990s. Of the 25 wards, 21 had
percentage point reductions in work-poverty that were
greater than the national average (Table 8). This resulted
in 10 of the wards falling below the 40% work-poverty
threshold, breaking the cluster into small groups. By
2001, the large cluster had broken into three smaller
clusters: Liverpool, Pirrie and Huyton.7
Despite these reductions, work-poverty rates in some
wards in the cluster remained extremely high (over
50%), especially in the groups of wards in the Huyton
cluster, an area made up largely of inter-war and post
war public housing, whose residents had been heavily
dependent on employment in large industrial estates. At
the other end of the scale, there was a dramatic reduction
in work-poverty (24.1 percentage points) in the small
Liverpool city centre ward of Everton. In the context of
an overall population loss of 12% for the cluster over the
decade, Everton’s population increased by 12%. By
contrast, the surrounding ring of inner city wards,
Kensington, Breckfield and Melrose, had major
population losses (23%, 26% and 21% respectively) and
increased their rates of work-poverty. Thus within the
inner city, there was a polarisation of poverty, with the
central city area gaining a working population, and the
inner ring losing population and remaining poor.
The Manchester cluster demonstrated a similar pattern.
Again, work-poverty rates generally fell. No ward increased
its work-poverty rate, although four of the wards only made
very small gains, less than the national average. Work-
poverty rates generally in this cluster were lower in 1991
than in the Liverpool cluster, and the reductions were
sufficient to bring 6 of the 10 wards below the 40% work-
poverty threshold.The large of cluster of 10 wards in 1991
reduced to just 2 in 2001 (Cheetham and Harpurhey).8
However the same pattern of central city revival and inner
ring problems was evident. The Central ward in
Manchester saw a 27.2 percentage point reduction in
work-poverty, again apparently because of an influx of new
better-off residents. In the context of an overall population
decline for the cluster of 17%, Central ward increased its
population by 20%. Meanwhile the inner ring of wards to
the north and east of the city centre had losses in
population.9 Reductions in work-poverty in these wards
were small, although in some cases just sufficient to bring
the wards slightly below the 40% threshold.
By contrast with the other clusters, the Birmingham
cluster of poverty did not contain the city centre, but a
ring of inner city wards. Like the inner ring wards in the
other cities, these wards did badly in terms of work-
poverty. In fact, high rates of work-poverty were even
more stubborn here than in the other cities. Four of the
wards actually saw an increase in work-poverty, and only
one had a decrease equal to or better than the national
average. None dropped below the 40% threshold, while
an additional ward, Sparkhill, adjacent to the original
cluster, increased its work-poverty rate from below to
above 40%. Whereas in the inner ring wards in the other
two cities, rising or stubborn work-poverty was associated
with falling population, suggesting a process of
residualisation, three of these wards in Birmingham’s
inner ring gained population, because of their ethnic
make-up and consequently youthful populations. Overall
the cluster population increased by 10% over the decade,
and saw only a very small reduction in work-poverty rate.
ASSESSING CHANGE IN RELATIVE TERMS
These were very significant changes in the absolute
number of neighbourhoods with high concentrations of
work-poverty. However they took place in context of an
overall economic recovery, falling unemployment, and a
major drive to encourage more students into further and
higher education, which meant that in work-poverty
decreased in many areas, not just in the poorest. For
England as a whole, the level of work-poverty among
people of working age reduced from 24.4% in 1991 to
22.0% in 2001, a reduction of 2.4 percentage points. We
need, therefore, to know not only about absolute
reductions but about whether the absolute changes also
represent any relative shift in position between
neighbourhoods: were the poorest neighbourhoods in
1991 still the poorest in 2001? Had they closed the gap
on any other neighbourhoods?
Changes in ward boundaries do not permit an analysis of
change in individual rates of work-poverty for all wards
from 1991 to 2001. However, it is possible to examine
these changes for the six major conurbations in England
outside London, where there were no ward boundary
changes: the metropolitan areas of Tyne and Wear,
Merseyside, Greater Manchester, West Midlands, West
Yorkshire and South Yorkshire. These are the settlements
built up around the major cities of the industrial
revolution. Tyne and Wear contains the city of Newcastle
and surrounding districts like Gateshead and North
Tyneside;West Yorkshire the cities of Leeds and Bradford
and districts like Calderdale; West Midlands the city of
Birmingham and districts like Coventry, Sandwell and
Dudley; Merseyside the city of Liverpool and districts
like Sefton and Knowsley; Greater Manchester the
principal city of Manchester, the city of Salford and
surrounding districts like Bury, Bolton, Wigan and
Trafford; and South Yorkshire the city of Sheffield and
surrounding districts like Rotherham.
Between them, these conurbations, which had
populations between 1 million and 2.5 million people,
contained 825 wards, 10% of England’s total. They also
contained a disproportionate number of the country’s
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TABLE 8: Percentage Point Reductions in Work-Poverty
Rates in Wards in the Three Main Clusters
0, or an increase in work-poverty 3 4 1
2.4 percentage points or less 1 3 3
2.5-4.8 percentage points 6 1 2
4.9-9.6 percentage points 12 0 2
9.7 or more percentage points 3 0 2
TOTAL 25 8 10
Liverpool
Cluster
Number of Wards with 
reductions of:
Birmingham
Cluster
Manchester
Cluster
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work-poor wards: 44% of those with more than 40%
work-poverty in 1991 and 29% of those with more than
30% work-poverty. They contained the three largest
clusters of work-poverty, in Liverpool, Manchester and
Birmingham. However, they also contained many more
advantaged areas. More than half (57%) of the 825
wards fell below the 30% work-poverty threshold, and
work-poverty rates in 1991 ranged from 63.2% in
Princess ward, Knowsley, Merseyside, to 11.5% in
Broomhill ward, Sheffield, South Yorkshire. Studying
changes in ward work-poverty rates across these large
conurbations enables us to compare trends in work-poor
and work-rich wards.
84% (697) of the 825 wards experienced falling or static
levels of work-poverty between 1991 and 2001,
demonstrating the wide impact of economic recovery
and increases in further and higher education. As we saw
with the large poverty clusters, the changes were in many
cases not dramatic, ranging between 0 and the national
average of 2.4 percentage points, or between 2.5 and 4.8
percentage points. There were a small number of
extreme outliers, with falls in work-poverty of four times
the national average or more, most of them high-poverty
wards in the central areas of these large conurbations.
These included the wards of Central in Manchester 
(-27.2), Everton in Liverpool (-24.1) and Blackfriars in
Salford (-12.1) which we observed in our earlier
description of changes in the major poverty clusters. For
127 wards, there were increases in work-poverty, but no
ward had an increase greater than 4.8 percentage points.
This was a general picture of declining work-poverty, but
with some remaining areas. It was reflected in a fall in
the median ward work-poverty rate of 1.4 percentage
points (from 27.7% to 26.3%), lower than the national
average. The high falls in work-poverty among outlying
wards meant that the mean rate fell by the same amount
as the national average, 2.4 percentage points, from
29.3% to 26.9%.
FIGURE 4: Changes in ward work-poverty rates 
in English conurbations
In general, although there were some residual areas which
failed to benefit, it was the most work-poor wards that
had the highest percentage point decreases in work-
poverty over the decade, as Figure 5 shows, suggesting a
general pattern of convergence between the poorest
wards and the rest. Relatively, the poorest wards became
slightly better off.
However, the changes were not of sufficient magnitude to
effect any transformation in the relative position of wards.
There was a very high correlation (.96) between the
rankings of wards on their work-poverty levels across the
conurbations in 1991 and their rankings in 2001. As Figure
6 very clearly demonstrates, wards with the highest work-
poverty in 1991 had the highest work- poverty in 2001, with
the exception of a few outliers. High work-poverty in this
figure is represented by a low numerical ranking (ie rank 1
is the ward with the highest work-poverty). Most of the
biggest outliers lie above the general trend line on the graph:
that is to say that they were wards which saw a significant
drop in their work-poverty ranking not wards which saw a
significant rise. Among wards in the poorest decile, these
included Gillmoss in Liverpool, Blackfriars in Salford and
Central in Manchester. However, there were also
moderately poor and relatively affluent wards that
significantly improved their ranking. Among these were
Hulme in Manchester and Netherthorpe in Sheffield.These
were mainly central city wards or those close to universities.
Relatively few wards bucked the national trend enough to
see a significant rise in their work-poverty ranking.
FIGURE 5: Changes in Work-Poverty for Groups of Wards
with Different Levels of Work-Poverty in 1991
FIGURE 6: Work-Poverty Rankings 1991 and 2001
7 As the map shows, there was also a cluster in Kirkby, but not greater than 20000 
in population.
8 As the map shows, Bradford and Beswick were also clustered, but did not form 
a combined population of 20,000 or more.
9 Population counts used are from Census 2001 and EWC pop 1991. Subsequent
revisions show Manchester population for 2001 to have been underestimated but
revised ward level figures are not available.
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The result of these changes was that relative maps of
work-poverty for the major conurbations changed very
little over the decade. Although work-poverty
generally reduced, the same places remained poor
relative to the others, with a few dramatic exceptions.
We illustrate this here, in Maps 7 to 12, with reference
to the three conurbations containing the large poverty
clusters that we described earlier: Merseyside,
containing the Liverpool cluster, Greater Manchester,
containing the Manchester/Salford cluster, and the
West Midlands, containing the Birmingham cluster.
The maps for each city group work poverty rates for
wards in each city relative to each other. Thus for
each city in each year, the lightest shade represents
the least poor fifth of wards, and the
darkest the most poor fifth. As we
might expect the maps look very
similar, with only a few wards,
mainly central, changing
colour from 1991 to 2001.
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1991
19.4 – 22.8
22.8 – 29.6
29.6 – 37.4
37.4 – 44.9
44.9 – 63.2
MAP 7: 
Merseyside Conurbation
Work-Poverty Rates 
for Wards 1991
MAP 8: 
Merseyside Conurbation
Work-Poverty Rates for Wards 2001
2001
17.4 – 21.2
21.2 – 26.9
26.9 – 33.1
33.1 – 39.0
39.0 – 57.6
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1991
15.0 – 20.0
20.0 – 23.6
23.6 – 27.6
27.6 – 36.2
36.2 – 54.5
MAP 9: 
Greater Manchester Conurbation
Work-Poverty Rates for Wards 1991
MAP 10: 
Greater Manchester Conurbation
Work-Poverty Rates for Wards 2001
2001
14.6 – 18.6
18.6 – 21.6
21.6 – 26.3
26.3 – 31.3
31.3 – 47.0
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1991
13.0 – 20.2
20.2 – 24.2
24.2 – 29.5
29.5 – 34.2
34.2 – 51.5
MAP 11: 
West Midlands Conurbation
Work-Poverty Rates for Wards 1991
MAP 12: 
West Midlands Conurbation
Work-Poverty Rates for Wards 2001
2001
14.6 – 18.6
18.6 – 21.6
21.6 – 26.3
26.3 – 31.3
31.3 – 47.0
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EXPLAINING THE CHANGES
In summary, what we find is a significant change in the
absolute level of work-poverty, affecting work-poor
neighbourhoods as well as work-rich ones, and resulting
in a substantial drop in the number of high-work poverty
neighbourhoods. Between 1991 and 2001, the number
of such neighbourhoods, and the population living in
them, substantially declined, by about 40%.The number
and proportion of work-poor individuals living in these
neighbourhoods also declined. Large clusters of high
work-poverty broke up. However, these improvements
made little impact on the regional distribution of high
work-poverty neighbourhoods, which remained
predominantly in the industrial regions of the North. In
fact the gap between London and the Northern regions
widened during the 1990s as a direct result of the
capital’s increasing share of national economic
prosperity. London had surprisingly few high work-
poverty neighbourhoods in 1991, given its size, and its
share of poor neighbourhoods reduced during the
decade. The overall improvement also made little
difference to the geography of poverty within the major
conurbations. Although wards with high work-poverty in
1991 saw greater reductions than wards with lower work
poverty, these changes were not on a sufficient scale to
change the wards’ relative position. And lastly, there were
some exceptions to this general pattern. Some wards,
particularly inner urban neighbourhoods and those with
high minority ethnic populations, were more resistant to
improvement than others; while a small number,
particularly poor central city neighbourhoods, appeared
to undergo something of a transformation, with dramatic
reductions in their levels of work-poverty.
These changes obviously have their root in local and
regional economic trends. The different economic
performance of regions during the 1990s, with London
and the South East outperforming the Midlands and, to
a greater extent the North, will have provided varying
opportunities for work, and by the same token, local
labour market trends will have provided better prospects
for residents of some neighbourhoods than others.
However, labour market trends on their own explain
relatively little without an understanding of the
composition of work-poor and non work-poor
populations in each region or neighbourhood. The
national reduction in work-poverty that occurred during
the 1990s was not experienced equally by all labour
market participants. Principally, it was due to a
reduction in work-poverty among women (from 31.6%
to 26.7%). There were falls in work-poverty among
women of every age group, arising through several
different mechanisms:
• Reduced unemployment in all age groups, particularly
16-19 and 20-24.
• An increase in the proportion of students in the 20-24
age group.
• A higher proportion working in all age groups except 20-24.
• A reduction in the proportion of ‘other’ inactive
(including looking after home and family) in all age
groups except 16-19, and particularly in older age groups.
In other words, a higher proportion of women were in
the labour market in 2001 than 1991 and a higher
proportion were employed. By contrast, among men, the
level of work-poverty only reduced slightly during the
decade, from 17.8% to 17.6%.The only reductions were
in the 16-19 age group and the 20-24 age group.
Unemployment for men reduced in all age groups.
However these reductions did not result in more people
working, as they had for women, with the exception of
slight increases in the 16-19 and 20-24 age groups10.
Instead, reductions in unemployment were paralleled by:
• Increases in the proportion of students in 16-19 and 20-
24 age groups.
• Increases in the proportion of ‘other inactive’ in all age
groups, particularly the youngest age group, 16-19.
• Slight increases in permanent sickness and disability,
including in the younger age groups.
We can therefore speculate that differences in rates of
entry into and exit from work-poverty between regions
and neighbourhoods might depend on a combination of
variables affecting women’s opportunities to work and/or
study, including employment opportunities for women
and employment opportunities and wage rates for men,
affecting the necessity for women to work; but also on
factors affecting the likelihood of women taking up
opportunities available to them, such as family size and
composition; and the combination of wage rates, housing
and childcare costs and benefit levels, determining
whether women would be financially better-off in work
or on benefits while raising their children. Ethnic
composition of the work-poor population is another
specific and probably important factor. Some Muslim
women are not able to work or study unless in an all-
female environment. Large, young, families are also
more common among this group than other ethnic
groups, as are extended families in which women have
caring responsibilities for elders. These factors may well
explain the stubborn levels of work-poverty in inner ring
urban areas with high minority ethnic populations and in
regions like the West Midlands with large South Asian
populations.
The changes will also have been driven by absolute and
relative shifts in the distribution of work-poor and non
work-poor populations between neighbourhoods. In
other words, by people actually moving between
neighbourhoods (an absolute shift) or by the natural
growth of population in some neighbourhoods and
natural decline in others (a relative shift).
The overall context for the changes in work-poverty was
a continuing decline in the populations of cities. London
had, by British standards, rapid population growth in the
1990s, increasing by 7%, while all of the principal
metropolitan cities except Leeds lost population, as did
most other large cities. Of the cities with the large
poverty clusters, Liverpool lost 7% of its population,
10 Changes in these age groups may possibly be accounted for by the higher proportion of
18-25 year olds on government training schemes (counted as work) in 2001 than in 1991.
Birmingham 2% and Manchester 3%.11 Population losses
came about partly through a continuing process of
counter-urbanisation, and partly because of natural losses
in the ageing populations of former industrial communities
in inner cities. Original inner city residents dying or
moving away tended not to be replaced, as the overall
population distribution of the country as a whole tilted
towards the more prosperous south east and to smaller
cities and towns with strong service industries and without
the declined industrial legacy of the major conurbations.
Since the most disadvantaged residents tend to be the least
likely to move, situations such as this tend to lead to
increasing poverty rates in declining inner urban
populations, or (in a situation of overall decline in work-
poverty such as that of the 1990s) to smaller reductions
than in other neighbourhoods. It can be described as a
process of residualisation.
However, there were two trends during the 1990s that were
causing some inner urban neighbourhoods to respond
differently, either seeing big reductions in poverty or, on
the contrary, not experiencing the reductions seen
elsewhere.
One was the re-colonisation of the inner city by
professional households or students. London, with its
growth in the number of high earning professional
households, and high housing demand and high prices
pushing would-be buyers into run-down lower priced
neighbourhoods, has seen by far the biggest gentrification
trend. This has taken two forms. First, central city
neighbourhoods have witnessed new building or
conversion of derelict factories and warehouses for inner-
city apartments. Second, existing homes in low income
neighbourhoods, some of them formerly public housing,
have been bought up by higher income households, both in
central city neighbourhoods and in ‘inner-ring’
neighbourhoods slightly further from the city centre. Inner
neighbourhoods have gained high income residents
alongside low income residents. Middle income would-be
home-owners have effectively been priced out of the inner
city, leading to concerns about the recruitment of staff for
public services and the development of subsidised ‘key
worker’ housing.
In other cities, both of these processes have taken place on
a smaller scale.The more traditional form of gentrification
of inner neighbourhoods by individual households
purchasing homes in poor neighbourhoods has, in
particular, been much slower to happen in cities with lower
housing demand and prices and shorter travel-to-work
times for city workers living in outer neighbourhoods.
‘Downtown living’, however, has begun to take root in
most of Britain’s large industrial cities, affecting central
city neighbourhoods. Lambert and Boddy (2002),
surveying this phenomenon, described a growing scale of
residential development in and around central locations of
major cities, both through new development on vacant and
under-used sites and through conversion and
redevelopment of obsolete industrial and commercial
buildings.They described these developments as “relatively
modest in absolute terms” but “indicative of a major
qualitative shift in the nature and location of new housing
development in UK cities” (p8). Manchester has had the
most extensive developments, led in the early-mid 1990s
by pioneering property developer Tom Bloxham and his
fashionable ‘Urban Splash’ property design company.
Lambert and Boddy found record of 8630 new city centre
homes in Manchester either completed, under
construction or with planning permission since 1991.
However, Birmingham (3760), Leeds (3480) and
Liverpool (3160) also had significant numbers. Dutton
(2004) has noted that households occupying these new
homes tend to be of a particular kind: young, highly paid,
childless, transient, and sometimes part-time residents.
Alongside these developments, the growth in student
numbers, exceeding the accommodation available in
university halls of residence, has led to increasingly large
proportions of students in inner urban neighbourhoods
close to university campuses. Typically, student colonies
arise not in neighbourhoods dominated by social housing,
but those with cheap private rented homes, and appear to
be filling spaces that other households do not want (Rugg
et al 2000). They are creating distinct residential
environments in run-down inner urban areas that would
otherwise probably be residualised neighbourhoods with
declining populations and high proportions of less
advantaged households.
Both gentrification and ‘studentification’ have occurred
only in specific neighbourhoods. Location is critical, close
to the city centre, and so is the housing stock.
Neighbourhoods with high proportions of homes privately
owned or rented are much more responsive to these kinds
of housing market factors than neighbourhoods with high
proportions of social housing. In some cases, a changing
population mix has been aided by publicly funded
regeneration programmes, sponsoring demolition and
mixed tenure developments and upgrading facilities,
services, transport and the local environment. Where they
have occurred, these developments have resulted in
substantial drops in the proportion of people in work-
poverty, much exceeding the falls in work-poverty in
adjacent neighbourhoods.
A second trend has been the growth in population in inner
urban neighbourhoods with high proportions of South
Asian (specifically Pakistani and Bangadeshi) residents.
This growth can be partly attributed to natural growth
associated with the younger population profiles of these
neighbourhoods, which experienced primary immigration
of working age people during the 1970s and 1980s, and
also to continued immigration of family members during
the 1990s (Simpson 2004). While urban neighbourhoods
in declining industrial areas that had not experienced
immigration had ageing populations and little in-migration
of people of working age, immigrant neighbourhoods had
growing populations. Even had their work-poverty rates
fallen at the same rate as other neighbourhoods, they
would have formed a growing share of the work-poor
population and of the overall population. However, for the
reasons discussed earlier, work-poverty rates in Pakistani
and Bangladeshi neighbourhoods have tended to fall more
slowly than in other neighbourhoods or even to rise,
meaning that these neighbourhoods have become more
relatively worse off while poor neighbourhoods as a whole
have become relatively better off.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper has only been able to replicate part of the
analysis conducted in Glennerster et al. (1999) and as such
only offers a partial picture of change. Data on the relative
poverty measure may well show a different picture.12
However, given the central position of work in New
Labour’s social inclusion policy, these findings on their
own offer some important insights for policy-makers
concerned with poor neighbourhoods.
Our findings underline the continuing economic divide
between London and its hinterland and the rest of the
country. London analysts will point out, correctly, that the
decline in concentrated work-poverty that we show for the
capital is partly a function of the city’s dense population
and intermingled pockets of wealth and deprivation,
making it difficult for an electoral ward as a whole to hit the
40% threshold. Analysis at a smaller geographical level is
necessary to understand the changing geography of poverty
in London. It may also be a function of the fact that the
revival of London’s service economy, in combination with
high costs of housing and living, has tilted the poverty
problem in London towards in-work poverty rather than
out-of-work poverty. In-work poverty is not a problem we
are seeking to play down. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that concentrated chunks of worklessness, taking in
significant proportions of the population, are principally a
problem for the Northern regions.There is no escaping the
continuing effect of large scale economic decline in
Northern cities and regions, and the effort that is needed to
rebalance the national economy in their favour.
Another worrying development is our finding that
reductions in work-poverty were not shared equally by all
of the poorest neighbourhoods. Inner ring urban
neighbourhoods, particularly those with high South Asian
populations, tended either to increase their work-poverty
rates or to see lower reductions than the national average.
Such neighbourhoods were often situated alongside central
city neighbourhoods which underwent significant
transformations during the 1990s as a result of resurgence
in ‘downtown living’ or the increase in student numbers.
Their resistance to improvements had two different causes.
Most inner ring neighbourhoods were losing population
and seeing increasing proportions of work-poverty in their
residual populations, as economically active residents did
not come in in sufficient numbers to replace those who had
left. However, where inner neighbourhoods were gaining
population, it was often because of growth in numbers of
Pakistani and Bangladeshi households, which tend to have
lower rates of labour market participation and success than
other ethnic groups.13
This suggests that neighbourhood renewal policies designed
to improve public services and conditions in inner ring
neighbourhoods are unlikely to be successful unless
mechanisms can also be found to bring back job
opportunities to these areas, and/or to rebalance their
populations by encouraging the return of higher income
residents to inner suburbs, not just to central cities.The latter
may be successful on its own in some areas.There are specific
examples of effective housing-led regeneration of inner ring
social housing neighbourhoods. However, it is not clear that
these neighbourhoods, in general, have the same potential for
transformation through housing market restructuring as
central city neighbourhoods, pointing to the need to
emphasise labour demand issues and connecting inner city
residents to job opportunities, as well as housing renewal and
tenure diversification. Equally important, it appears that the
poverty rates of Pakistani and Bangladeshi neighbourhoods
are likely to remain high even when work-poverty rates fall
elsewhere, demanding a better understanding of the
respective roles of choice and constraint in preventing work
or study for people in these communities, and systematic
efforts to tackle the constraints of discrimination.
Neighbourhood policies need to become sufficiently
differentiated and sufficiently integrated with policies at the
city and regional levels to address the different drivers of
change which are shaping the new geography of poverty.
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